Deliberations

I read a paper today entitled Shifting Subject Positions: experts and lay people in public dialogue authored by Anne Kerr, Sarah Gunningham-Burley and Richard Tutton, in Social Studies of Science 37(3) (June, 2007) 385-411. I read it because I am grappling with the dominance of technocratic frames in deliberative events. When the topic of deliberation is the degree to which an engineered solution is acceptable, and the organising body is seen to support it, too often the lay participants are compelled to follow the agenda set by the organisers (as well-meaning as they present themselves) but are unconsciously shifted into only considering matters in the dominating technocratic framework. This is reinforced when participants find their own technocratic affinities mobilised, leaving the deliberation colonised. In several case studies in the context of science, technology and medicine, the authors found that counter-claims to technical advancement were discounted and left unexplored, even with the best efforts of facilitation to open the dialogue.

It seems that there is much work to be done to develop more open and stimulating forums for dialogue between professionals and public events in which participants can explore different subject positions and ambivalence more easily than has been our experience so far....Building such reflexivity into the organisation of public engagement events is far from simple.

This relates to a paper written by Joanna Goven entitled Deploying a consensus conference in New Zealand: democracy and de-problematization, Public Understanding of Science 12 (2003) 423-440. This paper analysed a consensus conference held in 1999 to deliberate upon genetic modification (GM) of crops in New Zealand. She describes how the topic came to be framed by the organisers and the [expert] panellists. She writes about a deficit model of proceedings, in which the primary goal seen by the dominant expertise is to educate the rest, and that the rational detail will prevail in shifting perspectives. Time runs out because a ludicrous amount of time is spent with obfuscating detail. But that's not all. The management of bias is seen simplistically as ensuring all views are presented. However, if all perspectives are presented within the framework established by the dominant expertise, it becomes a two-hander, an us-against-them template which strangles deliberative options. Like the water around fish, the bias in the overarching framework goes unrecognised by everyone, especially the deliberating citizens. This is reflected in the nature of the questions they ask of the experts. Instead of inquiring about the nature and context of the expertise, they remain fixed within that scope. Goven goes on to describe how the view of some stakeholders is externalised. For example the Maori perspective was acknowledged, but the considerations were not taken into account in the final recommendations because they were seen as being relevant only to that particular group rather than the broad public. From the perspective of the dominant expertise, I see this as a wedge tactic, which is anathema to a deliberative process. Goven describes all of these effects as de-problematisation which limits the scope of deliberation. The most hazardous outcome is that the very values and benefits that should drive the deliberating participants are not identified or quantified with sufficient conviction, if at all. Participants make their recommendations with resignation. Therefore,